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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model involving temporary equilibria with quantity
rationing in each period and price adjustment between periods. The resulting
dynamic system may present a variety of dynamic behaviors, ranging from the
convergence to stationary or quasi-stationary states, to complex or even chaotic
dynamics. In particular, our framework has the property of being able to en-
dogenously allow for the characterization of persistent disequilibrium phenomena
— such us unemployment or deﬂation. It provides therefore for an ideal setup to
investigate the eﬀects and persistency of recessionary phases, and to study the
eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent economic policies aimed at resolving them.
JEL classiﬁcation: D45, D50, E32, E37
Keywords: non-tâtonnement, complex dynamics, Phillips curve, expectations,
inventories, non-neutrality of money, deﬂation
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Disequilibrium phenomena seem to be common occurrences of many advanced economies.
Starting with the Great Depression, the high unemployment rates in Europe spanning
over a decade since the mid-Seventies, or the high inﬂation over the Eighties are just
prominent examples. The Japanese recession started in the mid-Nineties and not yet
fully resolved has put the combination of unemployment and deﬂation on the spotlight,
∗Catholic University, Largo A. Gemelli 1, I-20123 Milano. Phone: +39-02-7234.2637; fax: +39-02-
7234.2781. E-mail: lucava.colombo@unicatt.it .
†Catholic University, Largo A. Gemelli 1, I-20123 Milano. Phone: +39-02-72342728; fax: +39-02-
72342671. E-mail: gerd.weinrich@unicatt.it .making clear that a liquidity trap cannot be easily discarded as a purely theoretical
possibility. Most recently, the current global recession prompted by the ﬁnancial sec-
tor crisis seems to share similar features, and many observers and policy makers are
invoking Keynesian type remedies.
Nonetheless, many economists still consider the representative agent ﬂexible price
model as the workhorse of macroeconomics, despite its conclusions are irremediably at
odds with all the evidence on the persistence of disequilibrium phenomena (see, e.g.,
Blanchard, 2000).
For instance, a key result of the ﬂexible price approach is that of money neutrality,
which goes against the observed long lasting eﬀects on output and employment of
monetary shocks. The New Keynesian literature that developed over the Nineties (see,
e.g., Ball and Romer, 1990, and Blanchard, 1990) has emphasized the role of nominal
and real rigidities in the wage and price adjustment processes in determining large
aggregate eﬀects of monetary shocks. However, most economists maintain that the
price level eventually adjusts so that money neutrality is restored. We claim instead
that the result of money neutrality in the long run should not be taken for granted,
and that the economy may remain stuck in a quasi-stationary state of permanent
unemployment, in the absence of appropriate policy interventions.
Building on previous work (e.g. Colombo and Weinrich, 2003a, and Bignami,
Colombo and Weinrich, 2004), we develop a conceptual framework that endogenously
allows for the emergence of disequilibrium situations (such us unemployment or deﬂa-
tion), and provides therefore for an ideal setup to investigate the eﬀects and persistency
of shocks, and the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent economic policies. In particular, we consider
an economy consisting of overlapping generations consumers, ﬁrms producing by means
of an atemporal production function, and a government ﬁnancing public expenditure
through a tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Within each period prices are ﬁxed, and consistent
allocations are obtained by means of temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing.
Prices are then adjusted between successive periods according to the strength of ra-
tioning on each market in the previous period.
The gradual adjustment of prices and wages (and hence their inability to function
as instantaneous and perfect allocation devices and the need for quantity adjustments
to complement them in making trades feasible) is the primary mechanism to explain
the propagation and the persistent real eﬀects of shocks. It is worth stressing that we
do not account endogenously for the reasons behind diﬀerent degrees of wage and price
2stickiness, but we rather rely on exogenously given rules. Although in this perspective
our approach is obviously ad hoc, it is on the other hand consistent with several un-
derlying conceptual models of price rigidities (be they in the New Keynesian or in the
Neoclassical tradition), and it allows us to eﬀectively parametrize the diﬀerent degrees
of wage and price stickiness that are observed in reality.1
The role of price and wage rigidities is complemented by that of other factors am-
plifying the importance of the spillovers among markets and aﬀecting the reaction
of consumers and ﬁrms to shocks and policy interventions. Following Colombo and
Weinrich (2006, 2008), we focus in particular on the role of consumers’ expectations
and ﬁrms’ inventories. Expectations are especially important since they inﬂuence con-
sumers’ choices and hence the response of the economy to a shock. For instance, a
restrictive shock may determine an aggregate demand deﬁcit and lead the economy
into a state of (Keynesian) unemployment. Finding ways to convince consumers to
hold inﬂationary expectations — in this way increasing their current consumption and
hence aggregate demand — may prove a powerful tool for recovering from the recession.
At the same time, the explicit consideration of ﬁrms’ inventories is important for fully
assessing the impact of a shock on the economy. Focusing again on a restrictive shock,
inventories have in fact an obvious reinforcement eﬀect: by increasing the reduction in
labor demand following the shock, inventories contribute to further depress the aggre-
gate demand and to favor the convergence of the economy to a quasi-stationary state
with permanent unemployment.
In the second part of the paper, we will discuss in detail the direct eﬀects and
the interplay of expectations and inventories in the propagation of shocks and in the
explanation of their persistence, as well as their inﬂuence on the outcomes of diﬀerent
economic policies aimed at resolving or mitigating the eﬀects of deﬂationary recessions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline our base model, deﬁne
a temporary equilibrium, show its existence and uniqueness, and study the dynamics
of the economy. In Section 3 we investigate by means of numerical simulations the
1The New Keynesian literature, in particular, has investigated many possible causes for the real
rigidity of prices and wages ranging from eﬃciency wages (see, for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984)
and countercyclical mark-ups (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991), to coordination failure (e.g. Ball
and Romer, 1991) and credit markets imperfections (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, and Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997). Attention has been devoted as well to the sources of nominal stickiness focusing,
for instance, on menu cost (e.g. Mankiw, 1985), near rationality (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) and
staggered contracts (Calvo, 1983).
3dynamic behavior of the economy, focusing on the eﬀects of the adjustment of prices
and wages, and showing the possibility of chaotic dynamic behavior as well as the
emergence of a Phillips curve as an attractor of our dynamic system. In Section 4 we
extend our base model to encompass the role of consumers’ expectations and ﬁrms’
inventories, and in Section 5 we study the dynamic behavior of the extended economy
by focusing especially on the possible policy remedies to deﬂationary recessions. Section
6 summarizes and suggests avenues for future research.
2 The Base Model
Following Colombo and Weinrich (2003a) and Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich (2004),
we focus on an economy composed of n OLG-consumers oﬀering labor inelastically
when young and consuming a composite consumption good in both periods of their
life. The consumption good is produced by n0 ﬁrms, using an atemporal production
function whose only input is labor. The public sector of the economy is represented by a
government that levies a proportional tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts to ﬁnance its expenditure for
goods. Budget deﬁcits and surpluses may arise through money creation or destruction.
The timing of the model is such that the aggregate proﬁt Πt−1 realized by ﬁrms in
period t−1 is distributed at the beginning of period t in part as tax to the government
(taxΠt−1) and in part to young consumers ((1 − tax)Πt−1), where 0 ≤ tax ≤ 1.A l s oa t
the beginning of period t old consumers hold a total quantity of money Mt — consisting
of savings generated in period t − 1 — that allows households to transfer purchasing
power between periods.
We denote with Xt the aggregate quantity of the good purchased by young con-
sumers in period t, pt its price, wt the nominal wage and Lt the aggregate quantity of
labor. Then we get Mt+1 =( 1− tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptXt.
Letting G be the quantity of goods purchased by the government and taking into
account that old households want to consume all their money holdings in period t,t h e
aggregate consumption is Yt = Xt + Mt
pt + G. Since Πt = ptYt − wtLt,d e n o t i n gw i t h
Πt − Πt−1 = ∆MP
t and ∆MC
t = Mt+1 − Mt the variation in the money stock held
by producers before they distribute proﬁts and by consumers, respectively, we obtain
∆MC
t + ∆MP
t = ptG − taxΠt−1 = budget deﬁcit.
Young households ﬁrst visit the labor market where they either can sell their in-
elastic labor supply  s, or they are rationed to zero. Then on the goods market they
4may be rationed according to the stochastic rule
xt =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xd
t with prob. ργd
t
ctxd




t is the quantity demanded, ρ ∈ [0,1] a ﬁxed structural parameter of the
rationing mechanism, γd
t ∈ [0,1] a rationing coeﬃcient which the household perceives







are chosen such that the expected value of xt is γd
txd
t,t h a ti s ,Ext = γd
txd
t.
The eﬀective demand xdi
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pt  s are real income in case of rationing and no
rationing on the labor market, respectively, and θe
t = pe
t+1/pt is the expected relative
price for period t.
The aggregate supply of labor is Ls = n s. Denoting with Ld
t the aggregate demand
of labor and with λs






the fraction of young consumers that will be



















t are the eﬀective quantities demanded in case of rationing and no










¢1−h we obtain that the eﬀective demand xdi
t is equal to hωi
t,
which is independent of γd
t and θe
t, although it depends on the real income ωi
t.The total
aggregate demand of the consumption sector is then obtained by adding old consumers’
aggregate demand Mt/pt and government demand G:
Y d
t = Xd (λs
t;αt,(1 − tax)πt)+mt + Gt,
where αt = wt/pt,πt = Πt−1/pt and mt = Mt/pt.
Each of the n0 identical ﬁrms uses an atemporal production function yt = f ( t). As
with consumers, ﬁrms too may be rationed, by means of a rationing mechanism ana-
5logue to that assumed for the consumption sector. Denoting the single ﬁrm’s eﬀective
demand of labor by  d
t, the quantity of labor eﬀectively transacted is
 t =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 d
t with prob. λd
t




t ∈ [0,1]. On the goods market the rationing rule is
yt =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
ys
t, with prob. σγs
t
dtys
t, with prob. 1 − σγs
t
, (1)
where σ ∈ (0,1),γs





t) .σis a ﬁxed parameter of the mechanism
whereas λd
t and γs
t are perceived rationing coeﬃcients taken as given by the ﬁrm the
eﬀective value of which will be determined in equilibrium. The deﬁnition of dt ensures
that Eyt = γs
tys
t. It is obvious that E t = λd
t d
t.
The ﬁrm’s eﬀective demand  d
t =  d (γs
























The aggregate labor demand is Ld
t = n0 d
t (γs
t;αt) ≡ Ld (γs
t;αt) and, because only a
fraction λd















2.1 Temporary Equilibrium Allocations
For any given period t a feasible allocation can be described as a temporary equilibrium
with rationing as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 : Given a real wage αt, ar e a lp r o ﬁtl e v e lπt, real money balances mt,














rary equilibrium with rationing if the following conditions are fulﬁlled:












t;αt,(1 − tax)πt)+δtmt + εtG;














t (1 − δt)=0 ;δt (1 − εt)=0 .
Conditions (C1) and (C2) require that expected aggregate transactions balance.
This means that all agents have correct perceptions of the rationing coeﬃcients. Equa-
tions (C3) formalize the short-side rule according to which at most one side on each
market is rationed. The meaning of the coeﬃcients δt and εt is that also old households
and/or the government can be rationed. However, according to condition (C4) this may
occur only after young households have been rationed (to zero).
Depending on which market sides are rationed, we can characterize diﬀerent types
of equilibrium. More precisely, we indicate with Keynesian Unemployment [K]a n
equilibrium in which there is excess supply on both markets (λs
t < 1,γ s
t < 1);w i t h
Repressed Inﬂation [I] one in which there is excess demand on both markets (λd
t < 1,
γd
t < 1);w i t hClassical Unemployment [C] one where there is excess supply on the
labor market and excess demand on the goods market (λs
t < 1,γ d
t < 1);a n dﬁnally
with Underconsumption [U]a ne q u i l i b r i u mw i t he x c e s sd e m a n do nt h el a b o rm a r k e t
and excess supply on the goods market (λd
t < 1,γ s
t < 1) .
The existence and uniqueness of temporary equilibrium is shown in Colombo and
Weinrich (2003a, pp. 9-12). In particular it is shown that the notion of temporary




=( L(αt,πt,m t,G,tax), Y (αt,πt,m t,G,tax)).
2.2 Dynamics
In order to investigate the dynamic behavior of the economy, we need to link successive
periods, which is done by the adjustment of prices and by the changes in the stock of
money and in proﬁts. As for the latter, by deﬁnition of these variables one immediately
obtains
Πt = ptY (αt,πt,m t,G,tax) − wtL(αt,πt,m t,G,tax)
and
7Mt+1 =( 1 − tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptXt =( 1− tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptY t + δtMt + εtptG =
(1 − tax)Πt−1 − Πt + δtMt + εtptG.
Regarding the adjustment of prices we make the standard assumption that whenever
an excess of demand (supply) is observed, the price rises (falls). In terms of the rationing
coeﬃcients observed in period t, this amounts to
pt+1 <p t ⇔ γs
t < 1; pt+1 >p t ⇔ γd
t < 1;
wt+1 <w t ⇔ λs
t < 1; wt+1 >w t ⇔ λd
t < 1.
More precisely, in our numerical analysis, these adjustments have been speciﬁed by
means of the non-linear rules:2
pt+1 =( γs
t)
μ1 pt, if γs
t < 1; pt+1 =
µ
γd















where μ1,μ 2,ν1 and ν2 are nonnegative parameters for the speeds of adjustment.














































∈ K ∪ U,
2The rules we consider here are the same used in Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich (2004). In
Colombo and Weinrich (2003a) we consider instead linear adjustment rules. The diﬀerent formulations
of the adjustment mechanisms are without implications in terms of the qualitative results emerging











∈ I ∪ C.
The dynamics of the model in real terms is given by the sequence {(αt,m t,πt)}
∞
t=1,
where αt+1 is as above and
πt+1 =






[δtmt + εtG +( 1− tax)πt] − πt+1.
3 Complex Dynamics and the Phillips Curve as an At-
tractor
The dynamic behavior of the economy outlined above is described by a non-linear
three-dimensional dynamical system with state variables αt,m t and πt that entails
three subsystems (corresponding to the three nondegenerate equilibrium regimes) each
of which may become eﬀective through endogenous regime switching.3 In order to
investigate the model dynamics one needs therefore to use numerical simulations.4 We
use the utility function u(xt,x t+1)=xh
t x1−h
t+1 and the production function f ( )=a b,
and we specify the following parameter set, corresponding to a stationary Walrasian
equilibrium as a benchmark case:
a =1 ,b =0 .85,h =0 .5,L s = 100,n 0 = 100,α 0 =0 .85,
m0 =4 6 .25,π 0 =1 5 ,G =7 .5,t a x =0 .5.
(2)
As shown by Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich (2004), the dynamic behavior of the
system is very sensitive to the choice of relevant parameters, such as the economic
policy instruments. The complexity of the economy dynamics is clearly illustrated by
the bifurcation diagram in Figure 1, showing the periodic (cycles of diﬀerent orders)
and non-periodic (chaotic) long-run characteristics of the system dynamics for diﬀerent
3The underconsumption regime is degenerate in the sense that it can be seen as a limiting case of
both the Keynesian and the inﬂationary regime.
4Our numerical simulations are based on the software MACRODYN that has been developed by Volker
Böhm at the University of Bielefeld.
9Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram for employment over government demand.
values of the government public expenditure G.5 It is immediate to note that for
G smaller than 7.5 (the Walrasian value) the economy converges to quasi-stationary
states with (Keynesian) unemployment, which illustrates the possibility of permanent
unemployment although prices and wages are ﬂexible. It is also worth stressing that,
as expected from textbook theory, an expansionary ﬁscal policy can help driving the
economy towards full employment. However, a too expansionary ﬁscal policy ends up
being destabilizing, as it induces an highly cyclical and irregular dynamic behavior, a
feature that has to be added to the risk of inﬂation that is traditionally associated with
expansionary policy measures.
The dynamic response of our economy to a shock also crucially depends on the values
of prices and wage adjustment speeds. For instance, Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich
(2004) have shown that following a restrictive monetary shock (e.g. a reduction to
m0 =4 0 ) to allow for some wage ﬂexibility downwards helps the system to return to the
Walrasian equilibrium, as expected from textbook theory. However, further increasing
the downward ﬂexibility of wage over a certain threshold gives rise to irregular (chaotic)
behavior with frequently high unemployment rates.6 As analyzed in detail by Colombo
5The ﬁgure has been obtained by using the benchmark parameter set, except for G that is allowed
to change, and by letting the nominal wages to be rigid downwards, i.e ν1 =0 . All other adjustment
speeds are set equal to μ1 = μ2 = ν2 =0 .4.
6The threshold level of ν1 at which irregular behavior appears is about 0.14 (see Bignami, Colombo
10Figure 2: A long run Phillips-curve.
and Weinrich (2003a), a too high downwards adjustment speed of the wage has striking
implications in terms of the dynamic behavior of employment and prices. This is evident





inﬂation rate (vt = (wt+1 − wt)/wt) plane. In an economic perspective, it is apparent
that this attractor describes a Phillips curve. However, it is impossible to interpret this
Phillips curve as a policy instrument in terms of a trade-oﬀ between unemployment and
inﬂation as is commonly done. Any point on the curve is in fact but one element of a
trajectory of pairs of rates of unemployment and wage inﬂation, and successive points
of this trajectory may lie far away one from the other. Thus, even if the government
tried to select a speciﬁc point on the curve in one period, in the next period already
the system may go to a very diﬀerent point on the curve.
4 AM o d e lw i t hC o n s u m e r s ’E x p e c t a t i o n sa n dF i r m s ’I n -
ventories
The main contribution of the setup presented in Section 2 consists in developing (and
characterizing the dynamic behavior of) a framework in the Keynesian tradition able
to account for the emergence of endogenous business cycles, and for the possible con-
and Weinrich, 2004, for a more detailed analysis).
11vergence of the economy to quasi-stationary states characterized by disequilibrium sit-
uations (e.g. long-run unemployment or capacity under-utilization), even when prices
and wages are allowed to adjust over time. Although providing useful results both in
a methodological and in an economic perspective, this basic framework neglects sev-
eral features that would be useful in using the above setup to investigate real world
situations, and evaluate the eﬀects of diﬀerent economic policies. Improving over the
modeling shortcomings of the basic setup becomes especially important if one has the
ambition to use the above approach as a lens to interpret and investigate the eﬀects of
crises like the one we are experiencing these days, for which Keynesian type remedies
are invoked and being adopted.
In a series of recent papers, that in a policy perspective are motivated mainly by the
study of deﬂationary recessions (as the one that hit Japan over the Nineties), we extend
our framework to embed features allowing us to investigate the eﬀects of variables that
provide important channels for the propagation and the persistency of shocks, and play
a prominent role in the current policy debate. In particular, in Colombo and Weinrich
(2006) we add to the basic model presented in Section 2 the possibility of inventories
holding by ﬁrms, and in Colombo and Weinrich (2008) we focus on the role played by
consumers expectations. In the following, we outline a model combining both these
features.
We consider the same economy as in the basic setup introduced in Section 2. How-
ever, as we now explicitly consider the role of consumer expectations, whether old
consumers hold a total quantity of money Mt (consisting of the savings generated in
period t−1) at the beginning of period t depends on their price expectations for their
second period of life. Since consumers may store the consumption good bought in the
ﬁrst period, they will voluntarily hold money only if they expect the good’s price to
decrease. They may be forced, however, to do this in case they are rationed in their
consumption goods purchases in the ﬁrst period. Firms too may now transfer unsold
units of the consumption good into the future, as we allow for inventories holding by
ﬁrms. Denoting with St the aggregate amount of inventories carried over by ﬁrms to
period t,w i t hY
p
t the aggregate amount of goods produced and with Yt the quantity
sold in period t,t h e r er e s u l t sSt+1 = Y
p
t + St − Yt.
Taking expectations into account, young consumers have to decide whether to buy
the quantities xt and xt+1 in periods t and t+1, respectively, or buy the total quantity




t < 1, then the consumer expects a decrease in the
goods price and hence prefers to buy xt+1 in his second period of life, while if θe
t > 1
he buys everything in his ﬁrst period.
The case θe
t < 1 is identical to the consumer’s problem discussed in the base model
of Section 2. As for the case θe
t > 1, the consumer wants to buy the total quantity
xt + xt+1 ≡ b xt in his ﬁrst period of life, and thus has to meet the budget constraint
xt + xt+1 ≤ ωi
t ,i =0 ,1 .
Monotonicity of the utility function implies that his eﬀective demand is b xdi
t = ωi
t.
Hence, the aggregate demand of goods by young consumers in case of deﬂationary
expectations θe






























whereas in case of inﬂationary expectations θe




t +( 1− λs
t)nb xd0
t



















F r o m( 3 )a n d( 4 )i ti se v i d e n tt h a tt h eo n l yd i ﬀerence in the aggregate eﬀective demand
by young consumers implied by diﬀerent expectations θe
t < or > 1 lies in the multi-
plicative factor τ ∈ {h,1}. Therefore, we identify the value of τ with the corresponding
expectation type.
The total eﬀective aggregate demand of the consumption sector is now obtained,
as in our base setup, by adding old consumers’ aggregate demand mt = Mt/pt and
government demand G:
Y d
t = Xd (λs
t;αt,(1 − tax)πt,τ)+mt + G
where αt ≡ wt/pt and πt ≡ Πt−1/pt.
Turning now to the production sector, we continue to assume that all ﬁrms are
identical and produce according to the production function y
p
t = f ( t)=a b
t,a,b>0.
Denoting with st the inventories held at the beginning of period t, the total amount
supplied by a ﬁrm is ys
t = y
p
t +st.A sf o rﬁrms’ rationing, we assume again 0-1 rationing
in the labor market and thus, recalling that  d
t is the single ﬁrm’s eﬀective demand of
13labor and λd
t ∈ [0,1] is the probability that the ﬁrm is not rationed on the labor
market, it follows that E t = λd
t d
t. On the goods market the rationing rule is the same



















t we get each ﬁrm’s
eﬀective labor demand as
 d









which is independent of st. The aggregate labor demand then is Ld
t = n0 d (γs
t;αt) ≡
Ld (γs
t;αt) and, because only a fraction λd
t of ﬁrms can hire workers, the aggregate















4.1 Temporary Equilibrium Allocations
For any t, the deﬁnition of a temporary equilibrium with rationing is now described by
the following
Deﬁnition 2 Given a real wage αt, ar e a lp r o ﬁt level πt, real money balances mt,
inventories St, a level of public expenditure G, at a xr a t etax and an expectation type














constitute a temporary equilibrium with rationing if the following
conditions are fulﬁlled:












t;αt,(1 − tax)πt,τ)+δtmt + εtG;














t (1 − δt)=0 ;δt (1 − εt)=0 .
The four conditions in the above deﬁnition have exactly the same interpretation as
in the base model of Section 2, from which they diﬀer just for the explicit consideration
of the role of expectations and inventories. Colombo and Weinrich (2008, Proposition




=( L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ), Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ)).
144.2 Dynamics
In this extended framework with expectations and inventories, the link between suc-
cessive periods is given by the adjustment of prices, by the changes in the stock of
money and in proﬁts and by possible changes in the expectation type. For given τ,t h e
adjustment of prices and wages is again such that the price rises (falls) whenever an
excess of demand (supply) is observed. More precisely, our simulations are based on
the following adjustment mechanisms:7
pt+1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩












where μ1, μ2, ν1, ν2 ∈ [0,1] can be interpreted as the degree of ﬂexibility of adjustment.
The dynamics of the real wage is then described by the following equations:
αt+1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨












































whereas the inﬂation factor θt = pt+1/pt is given by
θt =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
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. (10)
7Diﬀerently than in the base model of Section 2, we consider now linear adjustment rules, to
explicitly show that our results do not depend on the non-linearity of the adjustment mechanisms.
15The dynamics of proﬁts, money and inventories follow from the deﬁnition of these
variables and equations (9) - (10), i.e.
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+ St − Y t ,
where
Y t = Y (αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ) and Lt = L(αt,πt,m t,S t,G,tax,τ) .
It follows that the dynamics of the model is then given by the sequence {(αt,m t,πt,S t)}
∞
t=1.
We now need to consider the possibility of expectation switching, which should occur
whenever it is required in order to keep expectations correct along a trajectory of the
system. To illustrate the point, consider the case in which consumers have deﬂationary
expectations in period t (θe
t ≤ 1 or, equivalently, τ = h) but the equilibrium in period
t is such that there is excess demand on the goods market and thus pt+1 >p t.T h e
assumption τ = h in period t has then been incorrect and we substitute it by τ =1 ,i . e .
θe
t > 1. Obviously then a diﬀerent equilibrium arises in period t but we claim that the
type of equilibrium is still such that there is excess demand on the goods market. Thus,
expectations have been adjusted so as to become correct. Analogously we correct the
expectations in case θe
t > 1 but the equilibrium in period t involves excess supply on
the goods market. The rationale for doing this is given by the following lemma, that
is proven in Colombo and Weinrich (2008).
Lemma 1 Assume that for τ = h in period t an equilibrium with γd
t < 1 occurs. Then
this inequality is preserved when switching in period t to τ =1 . Conversely, assume
that for τ =1in period t an equilibrium with γs
t < 1 occurs. Then this inequality is
preserved when switching in period t to τ = h.
16Taking expectations switching into account, a trajectory of the dynamic system is
g i v e nb yas e q u e n c e{(αt,m t,πt,S t,τt)}
∞
t=1. It is important to stress that these state
variables are perfectly foreseen by economic agents in any period t, so that our dynamic
system is a truly forward looking one.8
5 Numerical Analysis: the Study of Deﬂationary Reces-
sions
The non-linear dynamic system representing the economy outlined in the previous
section is substantially more complicated than the three dimensional one investigated
in Section 3. In particular, we now have to deal with a ﬁve-dimensional system — with
state variables αt,m t,πt,S t and τt — composed of four non-degenerate subsystems each
of which may become eﬀective through endogenous regime switching. In analyzing
the dynamics of the model, we therefore need to resort to numerical simulations. For
this purpose, we consider the same benchmark parameter set used for the base model,
that is (2), corresponding to the stationary Walrasian equilibrium, with the addition
of S0 =0and τ0 = h, with trading levels L∗ = Y ∗ =1 0 0 .
Several factors are shown to complement the role of price and wage stickiness (ﬂex-
ibility) — that we illustrated in Section 3 — in determining the dynamic eﬀects of a
shock. The model outlined in Section 4, by considering explicitly ﬁrms’ inventories and
consumers’ expectations, adds further propagation mechanisms for shocks and helps
explaining their persistence.
Consumers’ expectations, in particular, have played an important role in the policy
debate. For instance, the 2008 Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman, in a series of inﬂuential
articles on the Japanese deﬂationary recession (see, e.g. Krugman, 1998), stressed the
importance of creating inﬂationary expectations to overcome the liquidity trap in which
the country got stuck. Although our setup does not oﬀer insights on how to create in-
ﬂationary expectations in the ﬁrst place, it theoretically supports this claim. To see
why, let us start from our benchmark parameter set (2) and consider a restrictive mon-
etary shock determined by a reduction in the initial money stock to m0 =4 0 , keeping
8In most cases of dynamic systems in economics, they are given by a system of implicit diﬀerence
equations, in which case an explicit solution in the sense of a (local) ﬂow of mappings cannot be
computed analytically. On the other hand, models that avoid this problem - giving rise to truly
forward looking dynamic systems - typically are not compatible with perfect foresight outside the
stationary state. For a systematic discussion of this issue see e.g. Böhm and Wenzelburger (1999).
17all other parameters and initial values at their Walrasian levels. Letting ν1 =0 .025
and ν2 =0 .1 be the downward and upward adjustment speeds of wages, respectively,
and μ1 = μ2 =0 .1 the adjustment speeds of prices out of the Walrasian equilibrium,
Figure 3 shows the convergence of the dynamic system to a deﬂationary recessionary
quasi-stationary state (α,m,π,S,τ) entailing a permanent decrease in employment and
output.9
Consider now a change in consumers’ expectations from τ = h to τ =1 , that is
(α0,m 0,π0,S 0,τ0)=( α,m,π,S,1). Expecting inﬂation for the next period, young
consumers demand all their planned life-time consumption in the ﬁrst period, which
boosts aggregate demand and can potentially lead the economy out of the recession.
This is shown in Figure 4 for ν1 =0 .025 and ν2 =0 .1, where the economy returns
immediately to full employment and the inﬂationary expectations are conﬁrmed. More
precisely, the percentage price inﬂation, φt =1 0 0( pt+1 − pt)/pt, remains positive over
a prolonged period of time, meaning that the economy ﬁnds itself each period in a state
of repressed inﬂation, which conﬁrms the validity of Krugman’s policy suggestion.
It is also interesting to note that the degree of stickiness of the nominal wage (and
price) seems to aﬀect the ability of inﬂationary expectations to restore full employ-
ment. Figure 5 shows that, when a higher downward ﬂexibility of the wage rate is
assumed (ν1 =0 .06 in the ﬁgure), the increase in aggregate demand due to anticipated
purchases by consumers is not suﬃcient to overcome the recession, and expectations re-
turn from inﬂationary to deﬂationary after one period. This conﬁrms that inﬂationary
expectations need to be sustained over time to help escaping a deﬂationary recession;
something in the spirit of the ‘irresponsible’ monetary policy — i.e., a monetary policy
remaining expansionary even when prices start rising — advocated by Krugman (1998).
It is ﬁnally worth noting that, for intermediate values of downward nominal wage
ﬂexibility, multiple equilibria with self-conﬁrming expectations will emerge (see Colombo
and Weinrich, 2008), which suggests that imposing downward wage rigidity may be a
useful measure to overcome a recession when inﬂationary expectations alone are not
enough to do so.
Further measures that can be eﬃciently analyzed in our framework and complement
9The downward speed of the wage adjustment plays a crucial role. Until approximately ν1 =0 .018
the economy is able to return to full employment after the monetary shock, whereas for speeds of wage
adjustment larger than this it gets trapped in the underemployment situation shown in Figure 3 (see
Colombo and Weinrich (2008) for a detailed bifurcation analysis).
18Figure 3: Time series when ν1 =0 .025 and m0 =4 0 .
19Figure 4: Eﬀect of inﬂationary expectations if ν1 =0 .025.
20Figure 5: Eﬀect of inﬂationary expectations if ν1 =0 .06.
21the role of inﬂationary expectations are based on expansionary ﬁscal and monetary
policies. Speciﬁcally, one such measure that received considerable attention in the
policy debate has been proposed in 2003 by Ben Bernanke for the Japanese recession.
It consists in a tax reduction accompanied by a transfer of funds from the Central
Bank to the government to compensate for the loss in tax revenue. In Colombo and
Weinrich (2003b) we formally analyze this policy and show under which conditions it
can eﬀectively help to overcome the crisis.
By focusing on consumers’ expectations, in the above analysis we left in the back-
ground the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ inventories. Although a full exploration of the role of inven-
tories is behind the scope of this paper (we refer the reader to Colombo and Weinrich,
2006), it is easily seen that inventories amplify the importance of the spillover eﬀects
among markets. More precisely, following a restrictive monetary shock as the one con-
s i d e r e da b o v ea n dp r o v i d e dw a g e sa r eﬂexible downward, the nominal wage diminishes,
which (if the decrease in the nominal wage is large enough) implies a reduction of the
real wage as well. The presence of inventories, by increasing the fall of labor demand
that in turn depresses labor income and aggregate demand, crucially reinforces this
reduction. Eventually the economy converges to a quasi-stationary state with perma-
nent unemployment, a constant low real wage and permanent deﬂation of the nominal
variables.10
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we outlined a truly forward looking dynamic framework that gener-
ates a wide variety of dynamic behaviors, ranging from cycles of diﬀerent orders and
complex/chaotic behavior to convergence towards quasi-stationary states where the
economy lies persistently far away from its Walrasian equilibrium.
Being capable to endogenously determine the emergence of disequilibrium situa-
tions, our setup provides an ideal framework to represent and explain the causes of
10The dynamic behavior of the economy following a restrictive shock becomes completely diﬀerent
whenever the nominal wage is rigid downward. In this case, the real wage and the real money stock
increase up to the point in which there start to be excess demand on the goods market and excess
supply on the labor market. At this point the goods price starts increasing again, which implies a
reduction of the real wage and of the real money stock until the economy converges back to the Wal-
rasian equilibrium. Therefore, unlike in the case where nominal wages are ﬂexible downward, imposing
downward nominal wage rigidity may be a measure limiting the eﬀects of deﬂationary recessions.
22prolonged economic crises, such as the recent Japanese deﬂationary recession, and to
evaluate the impact of alternative economic policies aimed at resolving them. In this
sense, our modeling may also prove useful in the analysis of the eﬀects and consequences
of the remedies that are being proposed to face the current global recession determined
by the breakdown of the ﬁnancial system.
Several extensions are possible that would extend the reach of our analysis. Three
of them stand at the center of our current research agenda in this ﬁeld. The ﬁrst
deals with the formation of expectations. In the current framework, we focus on the
role of agents’ expectations without investigating the process from which they arise.
Accounting endogenously for the mechanism of expectations formation may enrich the
scope of our analysis, by further highlighting the transmission channels of shocks and
the eﬀectiveness of alternative economic policies.
A second feature of the model that would beneﬁt from an in-depth examination
deals with inventories. In this paper, we focus essentially on their role as a propagation
mechanism of shocks and as a source of spillovers between markets. At the beginning
of each period, the stock of inventories carried by a ﬁrm is simply what remains unsold
at the end of the previous period. In this capacity, inventories are a passive element in
the decision problem of ﬁrms, while it would be more satisfactory to consider them as
strategic choice variables as suggested in the literature (see, e.g., Blinder and Fischer,
1981, and Blinder, 1982, where ﬁrms have a target inventory level and want to keep a
certain inventories-to-sale ratio).
Finally, a third aspect of our modeling that could be reﬁned has to do with the
adjustment mechanism of prices and wages. As we discussed in the Introduction, the
mechanism by which prices and wages are adjusted between periods is exogenously
given in the current formulation of the model. On the one hand, this adds to the
ﬂexibility of the approach, by making it consistent with a wide variety of possible
explanations for rigidities. On the other hand, in many circumstances it may be inter-
esting to focus on speciﬁc sources of stickiness, and endogenize them, to better explore
their implications in terms of the feedback and spillover eﬀects arising in the economy.
To explore the implications of these extensions and to generalize the scope of our
approach lies at the core of our current research.
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